
EXHIBIT D



1	REMOTE ZOOM APPEARANCES	
2		
3	APPEARANCES:	
4	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:	BRIAN ABRAMSON, ESQ. WILLIAMS HART AND BOUNDAS
5 6	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	JESSICA PHILLIPS, ESQ. JACQUELINE RUBIN, ESQ. PAUL, WEISS
7		MICHAEL SHORTNACY, ESQ.
8		PATRICK OOT, ESQ. SHOOK, HARDY AND BACON
9		
10	COURT REPORTER:	AMY GOODING, CSR CERTIFICATE NO. CSR 13386
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SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

MAY 17, 2024

2 PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. I think this is the first time we've met entirely remotely. I see all your faces on the screen. I suppose I should ask for purposes of this informal discovery conference to have counsel who expect to address the Court state your appearances for the record, please.

MR. ABRAMSON: Good morning, Judge Schulman.

Brian Abramson with Williams Hart and Boundas for the

Plaintiffs.

MS. PHILLIPS: Good morning, your Honor. This is Jessica Phillips from Paul Weiss on behalf of the Uber Defendants. With me is my partner, Jackie Rubin, who will also be addressing the Court.

THE COURT: All right, good. I'd like to hear some new voices as well.

Let's see if I can start with something before we get to the subject of the informal discovery conference.

Let me start with something that we can all agree on, I hope. I have just received in my email this morning a copy of Magistrate Judge Cisneros's order on the ESI protocol in the federal cases. As I understand it, the parties agreed that substantially that order will govern in this case, and I've been given a proposed order to be entered in this case that I assume effectively, word for word, copies Magistrate Judge Cisneros's order. Is that what this is? If so, does

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everybody agree that I should enter it as an ESI order in
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     this case?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: So, to your first point, it does
     not match Judge Cisneros's order word for word because there
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     were some issues that were specific to the MDL. We made
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     those modifications with Uber's counsel. I'll let Uber
     speak for themselves, but I believe it is ready to be
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     entered by the Court.
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               THE COURT: Great. Ms. Phillips?
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               MS. PHILLIPS: Thank you, your Honor.
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               I'll actually kick this one to my colleague, Mr.
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     Shortnacy.
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               MR. SHORTNACY: Michael Shortnacy with Shook,
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     Hardy and Bacon for Uber. That's correct. I agree with Mr.
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     Abramson. I think the parties had to put their heads
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     together on a couple of issues that were unique to the MDL
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     or maybe switching out federal rules with the California
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     Code and so on and so forth, but I understand the agreement
     has been finalized and submitted. We are in agreement, your
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     Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you. I mean, obviously, I
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     notice references, for example, to the Federal Rules of
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     Civil Procedure which don't apply in my courtroom. I
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     understand there may have been other minor changes.
               That order will be submitted today. Thank you for
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     submitting it.
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               Let's move on to more contested issues.
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     two issues that are the subject of the IDC, although there
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are clearly several others bubbling just below the surface.

But let me try and address the issues in the order that they have been raised.

The first has to do with Uber's request to take third party witness depositions during the current discovery period, i.e. the discovery period leading up to the Court's scheduled October 31st, 2024 deadline to set the bellwether trial order. As I understand it, Uber is seeking to take a number of such third party depositions during that period ranging, if I remember correctly, from two to seven in each one of the cases, the designated cases. Plaintiff's position is that those third party depositions are not necessary for Uber to rank the cases for purposes of the bellwether trial order and that they should be deferred until after that order is entered.

Is that a fairly accurate summary of the two parties' or the two sides' positions here?

MR. ABRAMSON: It is, your Honor.

MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, your Honor. I do agree with that.

I will make one small tweak which is that Uber has prioritized. Of the 18 remaining bellwether cases, Uber has prioritized four of those and reached out and indicated our interest in taking third party depositions in certain cases. You are correct in the four cases we identified, the number of third party depositions we are seeking to take in those cases are two to seven.

We are also interested in taking third party

depositions in the remaining 14 bellwether cases and, you know, will be — that number of course will be different in those cases because it's dependent, of course, of who the Plaintiff herself has identified as having that relevant information.

THE COURT: What is the significance of Uber

THE COURT: What is the significance of Uber having prioritized, as you put it, four of the remaining 18 cases? What does that mean?

MS. PHILLIPS: Sure. I think it is a way for us to begin pushing forward these third party depositions. We had to start somewhere. Internally, we happen to have prioritized these four cases. Within these four cases, these particular third party fact witnesses. As I said, we needed to start somewhere, and that's where we started.

THE COURT: What you're telling me, though, is that's where the dispute has arisen, but the dispute is a larger one because Uber's position is that it ought to be able to take third party depositions in all 18 of the cases during the current period.

MS. PHILLIPS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Do you have an estimate at this point as to the number of third party percipient witnesses whose depositions you would be seeking to take in the remaining 14 cases that are on the board?

MS. PHILLIPS: I don't have an estimate. In part, that's because it's dependent upon the Plaintiffs identifying some. I've certainly had circumstances where we have individuals identified in Plaintiff fact sheets and

then other individuals identified in answers to written discovery.

I am also familiar with the situation when if we depose, when we depose the Plaintiffs in these cases, additional individuals may be identified. Of course, the number varies in each of those cases. I don't want to give you an estimate because I don't have a reliable one.

THE COURT: But the two to seven, were these initial for quote unquote priority cases, you've identified as I understand it principally if not exclusively from the individuals whose names have been listed by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' fact sheets as having relevant information.

MS. PHILLIPS: That's correct. It's exclusively from both Plaintiff fact sheets and other written discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, look. Let's talk about this issue and let me give you my initial reaction to it and throw it open for discussion.

It seems to me where the parties agree, at least initially, is that where Uber ought to be focused is on during this initial period, that is leading up to the bellwether trial order, is on what information it needs in order to propose an order, in order basically to assess these cases and take a position on which ones ought to be tried first.

It also seems to me that some third party discovery may well be important to that assessment, and I agree with Uber that nothing in the prior orders that the Court has entered precludes either party from taking third

party discovery during this period.

On the other hand, I understand the Plaintiffs' concern that there's a lot to be done here during this period of time and that taking a large number of third party depositions during the period of time when the Plaintiffs depositions need to be taken, other discovery needs to be completed, including discovery against Uber, could be very burdensome and eat up a lot of the limited time that you all have available to you for discovery.

So, let me add one more thing. I'm back to the first hand again. I am concerned that if too much discovery here is pushed until after the Court's order comes out, there's going to be a time crunch between October 31, 2024 when the trial order is to issue and January 15, 2025 when fact discovery is to close under the order. That's really only two and a half months, and over the holiday period at the end of 2024. So, there's a balance, it seems to me, to be struck here among all of these factors.

I don't have a good sense from the letter that you submitted as to how important some of these third party witnesses are, in fact, to the assessment and ranking process that Uber needs to go through. It seems to me in the abstract -- and this is sort of as far as I can go based on the limited information you've given me in the letter -- it seems to me, for example --

I assume third party deponents here include the drivers themselves involved in these alleged incidents.

Is that right, Ms. Phillips?

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               MS. PHILLIPS: The drivers are not among the third
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     parties that we have requested to depose, but my
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     understanding is certainly that the Plaintiffs are
     interested in deposing the driver, and we agree with that,
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     that the drivers should be deposed prior to the ranking
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     deadline.
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               THE COURT: Right. Having seen a handful of
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     cross-complaints, in some cases the drivers may no longer be
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     third parties. They may actually be parties having been
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     named in cross-complaints in certain cases.
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               Is that correct?
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               MS. PHILLIPS: That's correct.
               THE COURT: How many of the drivers have been
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     named and served as parties, whether by Plaintiffs or
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     whether by Uber in a cross-complaint?
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               Do you know the answer to that?
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               MS. PHILLIPS: I believe the answer to that is we
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     have filed against drivers and have served, I believe, four.
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     Those are tentative numbers, and I can confirm those.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Abramson from the Plaintiff's
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     side, do you know what the numbers are in terms of drivers
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     who have actually been named and served?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: I don't know the answer to that,
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     no.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Well, where I'm going with
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     this -- let me not hide the ball anymore -- is I wonder
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     whether there's a way to craft a middle course here by
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     focusing on witnesses whose information really is critical
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to the assessment and ordering process but narrow it down from the number of witnesses who perhaps Uber would ideally like to take during this period of time. So, let me suggest a couple of things.

For example, if there is somebody who is a percipient witness to an actual incident -- let's say that person was either a passenger in the car together with the Plaintiff or observed some kind of interaction between the Plaintiff and the driver when the car stopped -- that person may well be a critical witness, and it would be understandable to me that Uber might want to take that person's deposition earlier rather than later.

On the other hand, if, as you suggest to me in the joint letter, the person called an Uber for the Plaintiff, and that's at least the extent of what you told me about that person's involvement, it seems to me that person is pretty far down on the list and their deposition is not going to be — their deposition is not going to be critical.

Now, you know, I recognize that there may well be folks who are in between those extremes. Let's say that there is an issue about whether the Plaintiff, for example, was under the influence of alcohol or some kind of drug and the third party witness — and that may bear on her ability to perceive. It may bear on her credibility or memory or something like that. I'm making this up, but I have a reasonable basis for inferring that may be an issue in some of these cases. And let's say the third party didn't observe the incident but observed the Plaintiff at a party

shortly before she called the Uber, for example. That person is kind of in the middle, if you will, of the spectrum that I'm suggesting between a percipient witness who actually witnessed the incident on one hand and somebody whose involvement in this may be much more -- or whose knowledge may be much more peripheral.

The middle course I'm suggesting here, maybe it's not that helpful because maybe I need to know more about who these folks are, what their percipient knowledge is and how important they are. But the principal --

The course that I'm suggesting is maybe there's a way of narrowing down the number of third party depositions to focus on those who are really most important to Uber to conduct over this period of time.

So, let me turn to Mr. Abramson first and get his reaction to this, and then let me hear from Uber's counsel.

MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you, Judge Schulman.

So, let me back up a little bit and broadly kind of expand on our position, if I then can address the specific kind of proposal that you're leaning towards.

So, on third party discovery, we agree third party discovery for the trial set cases will need to be done. There's no question about it. There is a difference, though, between having perfect information at this stage and prioritizing what actually needs to be done in order to get trials ready for the summer of 2025 in your schedule. These third party depositions are wide ranging. Of course, they want them, but we can't let perfect be the enemy of good

here. There are tons of third party depositions we want also, not just the driver. We put this in the letter. The persons who spoke to the client when they call in to report the incident, the employee at Uber who did the background check, the employee who made the deactivation decision or not, the employee at Uber who may have or may not have discussed the incident with law enforcement. We will get to all of those. None of us are working with perfect information.

(Whereupon, the court reporter asked the attorney to slow down.)

MR. ABRAMSON: Uber has access to all of those employees that communicated with the Plaintiff that made the decision about the driver. We don't have that information right now other than through some written form or through documents. The same holds true for Uber on the other side. They're going to get the deposition of the Plaintiff. They have a comprehensive fact sheet. We've done a lot of written discovery. That is sufficient to rank these Plaintiffs right now.

Once the Court decides on which cases will be set for trial in the summer of 2025, it's open season for third party depositions in those cases, and there will be far fewer of them to deal with.

The question that I don't think we are giving enough credence to -- and I know the Court has recognized this in the past -- these are sexual assault victims. Every time they have to not only be deposed -- and they've all

agreed to be deposed -- but now we're going to go to their families and relatives and people they may have talked to after the incident. This is another way to dissuade these women from going forward and having their day in court. For the ones who are going to trial, we need to do that, but why traumatize 20 women by taking four to five third party depositions right now when we have enough information from both sides, imperfect though it may be, to rank these Plaintiffs, get an order from the Court, and then focus in on full fledged third party discovery. We're going to have two and half months, but there's only going to be probably six to eight that we're really going to need to work up at that point.

There are hundreds of attorneys that are involved in this litigation. We can handle it.

So, with respect to your proposal, I understand there may be a situation where there are some, you know, I'll call it a liability witness as opposed to a damages witness, someone who was actually in the car. There may be that person. If they want to talk to us about that person, of course we'll meet and confer and talk about that one deposition. My suggestion would be let's get these Plaintiffs taken first. Let's focus on the Plaintiff. After taking the Plaintiff, if there's some reason that they need additional information that they deem relevant, we can ask your Honor for authority to do that.

Or it may be the other way. We may think, hey, we really need the driver or we need this person the Plaintiff

say they talked to about the incident. We may come to you and ask you for that before the deadline.

But I feel like we're biting off more than we can chew during this phase. With corporate discovery severely lacking, the focus is — we are very concerned that the delay is not necessarily going to be with these third party depositions in getting the specific cases ready, it's going to be with us getting the discovery we need from Uber from a corporate liability perspective to put on our case.

THE COURT: I do want to talk about those issues, but I'm putting them off until later in the hearing.

When you list, for example, potential percipient witnesses who are or were Uber employees who, for example, may have fielded a call or a complaint from a Plaintiff, may have communicated with law enforcement or decided not to communicate to law enforcement, whatever the case may be and so on, are you saying that Plaintiffs are agreeing to hold off on any of those percipient depositions until the fall as well?

MR. ABRAMSON: Absolutely. We can't have it both ways.

THE COURT: I wanted to clarify that.

MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, sir. The driver, too. Again, there may be exceptional circumstances on both sides. After taking the Plaintiff or based on the information provided that would warrant going to your Honor saying these three people on both sides, we really need to take those so we can understand this case so we know where to rank it.

That may be fine, but this blanket idea that right now we need to devolve into comprehensive third party discovery is, for us, is an inefficient use of resources and really is potentially harmful to our clients.

THE COURT: Let me throw out another possible approach here and get your reaction to it, and then hear from Ms. Phillips.

Another possible approach that occurs to me as we discuss this is to revisit this issue after the individual Plaintiffs' depositions have been taken. As one of you pointed out, you know, during the course of those depositions Plaintiff may well disclose the existence of somebody who is not listed in a Plaintiff's fact sheet or may clarify the knowledge or role of that person in her testimony, and that may prompt one side or the other to either have more interest or less interest in deposing that person. Maybe this question of third party depositions is one that we can revisit down the road once the basic Plaintiffs' depositions have been taken and you all have had a chance to absorb what that testimony tells you.

What do you think about that, Mr. Abramson?

MR. ABRAMSON: I think that sounds reasonable. I
think that we should focus on the Plaintiff depositions, get
those done, and if there are exceptional circumstances that
warrant a third party deposition on either side prior to the
ranking deadline, we should revisit that with your Honor and

THE COURT: Ms. Phillips?

seek your guidance on that.

MS. PHILLIPS: Thank you, your Honor.

I do agree with your Honor that there should and can be a middle ground. I think the right question to ask is what that is.

If I may take a step back, I have a few points, obviously, that I would like to respond to here. These are complex, highly fact-specific cases, and Uber needs to take sufficient discovery in advance of the ranking deadline for us, which is September 28th, to understand exactly what happened before, during and after these rides and how the incident impacted these Plaintiffs. This is important for precisely for the reason your Honor has recognized, which is to determine the facts and circumstances — and that is inclusive of damages issues — are representative of the allegations in the other cases in the JCCP. I think that's really critical.

What the Plaintiffs appear to be trying to set up is what we view to be a real asymmetry of the information prior to that ranking deadline. The Plaintiffs' counsel have full access to the Plaintiffs in this case. They've had access to the friends and family members. They can have conversations. We understand that in many of those circumstances they are or will be representing those individuals for purposes of the deposition, so those communications are privileged. Uber knows none of that.

So, what the Plaintiffs are suggesting is that information from Plaintiffs themselves in Plaintiffs' depositions without any other depositions to corroborate or

contradict that testimony is sufficient for the ranking.

And we just don't agree with that, and we don't think that's right.

In terms of the first proposal that you made, your Honor, talking about the percipient witnesses, people physically in the car, of the 20 bellwethers there were two cases where that was the situation. There were individuals in the car during the assault. As it happens, those are the two cases that the Plaintiffs have unilaterally dismissed. So, I don't believe there are percipient witnesses to the actual alleged assault in any of the 18 remaining bellwether Plaintiffs, which is why I certainly think we have to go broader. We are interested in understanding when somebody saw a Plaintiff before and after the incident, what they have to say about that.

It's particularly important because the third here where many of the Plaintiffs, a large majority of the bellwether Plaintiffs have alleged in their Plaintiff fact sheets that they were severely intoxicated and have memory loss due to the influence of alcohol or drugs. In those circumstances, third parties filling in those gaps is going to be really critical to our ability to rank these and, frankly, your ability to understand how representative these cases are for purposes of the other cases in the JCCP.

THE COURT: Really? I mean, if in --

You know, if it's a he said she said case as to what happened in the car and you already know that that given Plaintiff was intoxicated and there's no percipient

witness to the interaction between the Plaintiff and the driver, what is some third party witness going to tell you other than confirming what you already know, which is the extent of intoxication, for example?

MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, sure. I'm happy to answer that question, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the court reporter asked the attorney to slow down.)

MS. PHILLIPS: I'm sorry.

If the individual spoke with someone after the incident and didn't mention the incident, right? That would be relevant information for purposes of the credibility and the story that the Plaintiff has to tell.

Let's take WHEE11, for example. That is a Plaintiff who alleges she was drinking heavily on the beach. She alleges it is possible that one of the other people we are seeking to depose may have drugged her and may have, in fact, been the person who assaulted her. What we are trying to understand is what led up to the incident itself, and we think that testimony is very relevant and very important for purposes of our ranking.

In terms of your ranking.

In terms of other third parties, for example, we are interested in deposing some of the medical providers here, right? Understanding damages and how representative the damages are is going to be important for that ranking decision and understanding whether there were preexisting conditions and what the differences are in the post incident

1 damages. 2 For that, obviously, we will depose the Plaintiffs 3 but are interested in deposing certain of the medical providers who can get to those before and after an incident. 4 5 I wanted to respond, if I may, your Honor, to your 6 suggestion --7 THE COURT: Hang on a second. MS. PHILLIPS: Of course. 8 9 THE COURT: You all, obviously, are much more 10 focused in on these cases than I am. Let me just ask a 11 couple more questions to understand kind of the composition 12 of the cases. Of the 18 remaining cases, how many of them 13 are cases in which there was a report to law enforcement? 14 MS. PHILLIPS: I believe there are nine of the 18 15 cases where law enforcement third parties will be deposed. 16 THE COURT: And how many of the 18 cases are cases 17 in which there was a rape kit or other type of forensic 18 medical examination conducted? 19 MS. PHILLIPS: I don't have that number. 20 THE COURT: Presumably, it's less than the nine in 21 which there was a report to law enforcement. 22 subset of the nine. 23 MS. PHILLIPS: That's correct. 24 THE COURT: When you're talking about medical 25 providers, you're talking more broadly, I take it, about 26 Therapists who the Plaintiff may have consulted weeks 27 or months after the incident? 28 MS. PHILLIPS: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you talking about physical pelvic exams? What are we talking about?

MS. PHILLIPS: The focus, I think, will be predominantly on mental health issues. In some cases — certainly not all of them — there are also physical damages alleged. In those particular cases, we obviously would be interested in exploring the extent and whether any of those physical damages that were claimed after the fact were preexisting conditions.

THE COURT: I interrupted you. There was more that you wanted to say on this?

MS. PHILLIPS: I just wanted to make a couple of points with regard to time. One I believe your Honor alluded to. We have a concern. There is time now; it's May. We have until September 28th, which is the ranking deadline. After your Honor sets the trial order, we will be limited to two and a half months where there will be holidays. That makes scheduling substantially more difficult. We think it makes sense to get through some subset of the third party depositions now while we can where neither side is waiting for documents. We can take the depositions without needing to be concerned about document discovery from those third parties.

In the previous IDC where the Plaintiffs were arguing that the Plaintiff depositions should be pushed, we have proposed dates from Plaintiffs in five of the 18 cases. Two of the cases, those dates are in late August. We just don't think that that provides us with a sufficient amount

of time for us to wait for all the Plaintiffs to be deposed and then turn to third party depositions. We think third party depositions getting started on those while we are also getting started in June, July and August deposing the Plaintiffs themselves, that will help us move toward that January 15th discovery date.

This will be my last point on this, your Honor.

The January 15th date isn't just for the first, second or third cases that are going to go to trial in summer of 2025. It's all of the bellwether cases. It's all of the cases.

Uber cannot forgo taking important third party depositions prior to that deadline. We've got to take those.

What the Plaintiffs are proposing is to really jam them in in an incredibly condensed time period with the holidays.

THE COURT: You told me at the outset of your remarks that you agree that some kind of middle ground approach here, that is something in between a green light to all third party discovery for both sides and a red light to all third party discovery until October or November, I suppose, is appropriate. You've now told me that the second idea that I threw out which is that you all come back after the Plaintiffs' depositions is not practical because at least some of those may take place in late August.

What are you suggesting by way of a middle ground here?

MS. PHILLIPS: Sure. I think it probably makes the most sense for Uber and the Plaintiffs to meet and

confer on this. We've always been willing to talk to them. We reached out to them at the outset, and the answer was a flat no.

My proposal would be to meet and confer with the other side and see if we can come up with something acceptable.

THE COURT: That's always a tempting answer from counsel, but I don't want it -- I don't want anybody to take away from that I'm kicking something down the road here.

What's your reaction, Mr. Abramson, when you think that combined with my initial reactions here that's likely to be a productive avenue?

MR. ABRAMSON: We're always open to meeting and conferring to try to resolve issues without your guidance. That being said, I think it's more likely than not that we'll be back before you on the same issue in 30 days if we don't at least try to get to this.

The problem is there are middle grounds here. For example, after a Plaintiff is deposed, it doesn't have to be all at one time. It doesn't have to be for every Plaintiff's deposition that moves forward, and only then can you talk about any third parties. There are going to be Plaintiffs deposed in June. After June, if there's a third party witness that either side feels is relevant, let's have some timeframe where we meet and confer after a two-week period to confer after the deposition. And then we can come to your Honor if we can't come to a resolution as to what

additional third parties, if any, need to be deposed. That seems sensible.

The other point that Ms. Phillips made about all fact discovery needs to be on all twenty bellwethers, that's just not how we see it. I don't think that's necessary. I think the focus should be once we have trial set cases, discovery for those six to eight, however many your Honor decides, those are the focus until January 15th, and we can kind of put the other 14, 12, whatever they are, to the side for additional third party discovery.

The reality is I don't think this advances the ball because doing third party discovery right now before we know which cases really are going to need it, you're going to end up with a bunch of third party depositions that went forward that otherwise did not need to because they're not even trial set. I just don't understand the purpose of doing that right now when there's so much we need to do on the corporate discovery side and on this side. Let's focus on that.

THE COURT: Let me say two things here, and let's see if we can move ahead. Not to preclude Ms. Phillips if you have something additional.

First of all, I agree with Mr. Abramson. I did not contemplate when we set at the parties' suggestion a fact discovery cutoff date of January 15, 2025 that would apply to all of the cases. What I contemplated was that it would apply to the initial set of bellwether cases that are within the 20, now 18, that the parties have designated. It

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certainly doesn't apply to -- what do we have now? -- 340 or something cases. I don't think that's what you were suggesting, was it? MS. PHILLIPS: No, no. My understanding is that the January 15th deadline does apply to all the bellwethers, whether 18, or eventually 20. THE COURT: Let me suggest this. Mr. Abramson has in, I think, a pretty creative way melded or combined the two ideas that I threw out as a middle ground here, which is to say in each case within -- fill in the blank, he suggested 14 days -- after the completion of the Plaintiff's deposition, the parties will meet and confer about whether any third party discovery is desirable with the goal of limiting such third party discovery during this initial period prior to the bellwether trial order submissions, the cases that, you know, one party or the other believes are critical to their ranking and assessment of the cases. And then in the event that parties are unable to agree on that, then you can come back to the court. Mr. Abramson, is that a pretty fair summary of what you suggested? MR. ABRAMSON: More articulate, but yes. THE COURT: What do you think, Ms. Phillips? MS. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, my concern with that is that allows completely unilaterally the Plaintiffs to dictate the order in which the depositions are going do happen. For example, two of the four cases that we had attempted to take third party depositions in are the

depositions of Plaintiffs that have been offered only for late August. Right off the bat, again this allows the Plaintiffs to dictate.

What if, instead of meeting and conferring, what if we said three to five third party depositions in each of the bellwether cases going forward, and obviously we have to find mutually agreeable times for that. I don't think we have to wait for the Plaintiff depositions here. The Plaintiffs have identified, in the Plaintiff fact sheets and the written discovery, individuals they have said have important information for the cases. Those are the individuals that we are most interested in deposing, and our view is that we should go forward now instead of on a schedule unilaterally dictated by the Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: The problem with arbitrarily picking a number, whether it's two to seven or three to five as you just proposed, is I don't have any basis in what you've told me here for knowing how important these depositions are.

We've talked in the abstract about what a given witness in some unidentified case might or might not know. Obviously, I'm not familiar with the individual cases.

So, rather than pick an arbitrary number, I'm not ruling out here the parties talking. You know, for example, in cases where the Plaintiffs' depositions are not going to be taken until late August, talking now and having you calling up Mr. Abramson and saying: Look, I know we're going to meet and confer in the wake of the Plaintiffs' depositions, but we're concerned about times. We're going

to have 30 days after Plaintiff X's deposition in late

August. Here are one or two third party depositions that I really think are critical, and here's why.

I would be more comfortable with the parties proceeding in that way than with the suggestion that we adopt kind of a one size fits all rule of thumb of three to five depositions per case, because I just don't have any basis for knowing that's the appropriate number or why.

MS. PHILLIPS: I mean, I think, your Honor the why is because this is the number of people --

THE COURT: When I'm talking, please don't talk over me.

MS. PHILLIPS: I apologize.

THE COURT: You all may succeed in persuading your friends at the other counsel table that, yes, such and such a person is critical, and here's why. But all I'm saying is I don't really see a basis for me to say that makes sense in what's before me.

Of course, I'm not making any rulings at an IDC, in any event. I'm trying to assist the parties in reaching some sort of agreement that seems reasonable, but it's informal guidance. It's not a ruling. I can't issue a binding ruling unless there's a properly adjudicated motion before me.

So, I'm just trying to find a flexible way here of getting you all to guess without a whole series of contested motions. I don't want to hear, you know, 18 motions in 18 different cases about disagreements about whether third

party depositions are or are not critical. My hope is that you all can find your way toward a process that would allow you to agree on a middle ground. In most cases, it means talking after the Plaintiff's deposition, but in some cases if it means talking before them, I don't see why that's not a reasonable way to proceed.

MR. ABRAMSON: Judge Schulman, if I could maybe put a little more color on what you just said and propose something that I think is in line with what you said and may alleviate some of Uber's concerns. Maybe the way we can do it is for any Plaintiff deposition that is set before July 31st. They would have, at that point, two months. Within seven days, ten days, 14 days, whatever the number, both sides should meet and confer about any third party depositions that they wish to take that they deem to be critical. If we're unable to reach a resolution on those, we can bring it to your Honor.

Your Honor made yourself very available to us. It seems that we could probably get in front of you pretty quickly, depending on your schedule.

For any deposition of a Plaintiff set after July 31st, let's start that right now. This isn't gamesmanship or us unilaterally dictating stuff. These are sexual assault victims, and we're trying to find dates that work for them. It may be some that are in August. Admittedly, that will crunch them if we want to run through this process in a fair way. For anybody we can't give them a date before July 31st for, for those let's meet and confer now for both

sides. If we believe there's a critical Uber witness that we want to take, we'll talk to them about that and vice versa. We'll try to get those resolved right now so neither party is hamstrung with those Plaintiff depositions.

THE COURT: We're starting to slice this pretty fine.

MR. ABRAMSON: I understand.

THE COURT: Again, just as I don't want to accept a number pulled out of the air for a number of third party depositions, neither do I want to start setting arbitrary deadlines and say, well, the deposition was on July 30th rather than August 1st.

Let me suggest that the parties meet and confer as soon as possible, that Uber think seriously about narrowing the number of third party depositions that it wishes to take, and focus on the ones that it really thinks are critical to the assessment process and that that process start now, but to the extent that it's appropriate that you revisit it after a given Plaintiff's deposition and see if you can't reach agreement. I don't want to start creating out of thin air these hard structured rules that seem fairly arbitrary.

I've given you some initial reactions that I hope will allow you all to reach agreement on most, if not all, of these cases.

I kind of want to leave it there unless there's something critical that either side wants to add.

MS. PHILLIPS: Not from me, your Honor. Thank

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THE COURT: The other issue that you teed up directly here -- and I recognize there are these other issues lurking, but I want to put those off again until the end of our discussion -- relates to the strike process. I understand it, there have now been two individual Plaintiffs of Plaintiff's original list of 10 who have been voluntarily dismissed from the pool. And the latest of those, as I understand it, is that the Plaintiff has become nonresponsive, as it's stated in the letter here. I'm not sure if Plaintiff's counsel are unable to communicate with her or if she's unwilling to sit as a bellwether Plaintiff at trial. I'm not sure it matters. What Uber is suggesting here is that the Court revisit the process that we put in place just a month ago when the first of those Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed her case. And then, basically, it allowed Uber to strike one of Plaintiff's selections once a Plaintiff has been voluntarily dismissed.

Let me give you an initial and much more clear-edged reaction to this. Number one, I assume and will continue to assume unless there's some reason for -- compelling reason -- for me not to, that these dismissals were made in good faith. I'm not going to assume that they reflect gamesmanship or something worse on the part of Plaintiff's counsel.

Number two, I don't see a need at this point to revisit the process that we agreed on and that I ordered when you were last here on April 12th. What that process

was was a joint proposal from the parties that in the event a bellwether case was dismissed, whether by one party and whether by the Plaintiffs or by the Court, the party that initially proposed that case may choose a replacement. And if that occurred before July 10, then the replacement case may be considered in the pool for the bellwether ranking.

We're still just a little more than 30 days since we last discussed that issue. I'm not inclined to revisit it now. Even if I were, frankly, the proposal that Uber has made here strikes me as pushing in the wrong direction, because it would end up with a lopsided group of cases so that now there are 18 cases of which eight are Plaintiff's proposed cases, but you would have me say, well, now there will be only seven proposed Plaintiffs' cases, and if there were a further dismissal that number would decrease.

But, in any event, I don't want to spend much time discussing it because I don't think there's a need to do so now. If we get to the July 10 date and there's a flurry of dismissals thereafter or there's one or more dismissals thereafter, there's a reason for us to talk about that between that date and the September — I think it's September 30th, actually. You keep saying September 28th, Ms. Phillips, but I think it's the September 30th deadline for parties to talk about proposals.

Go ahead. Hang on. There's some echo going on here. Everybody not speaking, please make sure to mute yourselves.

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               MS. RUBIN: Let me try again. I think that's
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     better, right?
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               THE COURT: Yes.
               MS. RUBIN: Terrific, thank you. Jackie Rubin.
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     And it's nice to see you again, your Honor.
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               I just want to make sure we're talking about the
     same thing. First of all, the unilateral dismissals were of
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     choices that Uber had made to the bellwether pool. So,
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     there are now eight Uber choices.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I may have -- I did
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     misunderstand that.
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               MS. RUBIN: Okay. So, both of the dismissals that
     the Plaintiffs have chosen to make were Uber choices.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MS. RUBIN:
                          So, Uber now has eight, and the
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     Plaintiffs now have ten.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MS. RUBIN: That's number one.
               Number two is the process by which -- that we
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     proposed was not to change actually what had been ruled on
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     last time. It was, instead, to add another aspect to it
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     which is that if the Plaintiffs unilaterally choose, as they
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     did, again to dismiss one of Uber's choices, then Uber has
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     the opportunity to strike one of the Plaintiff's choices.
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     And then both Uber and the Plaintiffs would get the
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     opportunity to choose a replacement for those cases.
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               So, it makes it equal. Both sides have to choose
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     a replacement for themselves, and thereby makes it fair that
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if one of the Plaintiffs had gotten rid of one of Uber's choices, we would have the opportunity to get rid of one as well.

THE COURT: I feel like I'm sitting in a room with a bunch of chess competitors, and you all are consulting your game theory handbooks and trying to figure out what approach gives you the best advantage at the end of the day. Recognizing that I made a mistake in my understanding here, Uber, as I understand it, under the prior agreement and order has an opportunity to choose replacements for the two cases that have now been dismissed by the Plaintiffs.

MS. RUBIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Rather than trying to fine tune what we've already done and start monkeying around with it in ways that I'm not sure I have the sophistication to understand how they will affect parties, what I'm telling you is I'm inclined to leave in place the current proposal and the current order. And if there's a problem down the road, you all let me know about it. I don't want to keep revisiting issues.

So, that's my reaction to that. I've been pretty blunt about my reaction to that one. This is not one where I'm feeling my way and see whether there's a middle ground. I don't think it's appropriate at this point. It may become appropriate down the road. Let's not anticipate problems —

MS. RUBIN: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- one we've already solved, at least in the interim. Everybody okay with that?

1 MR. ABRAMSON: Yes, sir. 2 THE COURT: All right. Let me briefly just --3 Recognizing we kind of directly teed up these issues, let me just briefly explore the other issues that 4 5 have been raised in the letter here, because they do give me 6 some concern. And there are at least two that I saw. 7 One is what's been characterized as the slow pace 8 of Uber's production of so-called corporate liability 9 documents. I do see attached to the letter the so-called 10 hit list which shows me the number of -- gross number of 11 documents -- that apparently have been collected with 12 respect to at least the initial 16 prior custodians, if 13 that's what I understand the 20 million document number to 14 be. 15 MR. SHORTNACY: Michael Shortnacy speaking. 16 Twenty-six priority custodians, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Twenty-six priority custodians but 20 18 million documents, right? 19 MR. SHORTNACY: Correct. 20 THE COURT: And then I see the number of hits by 21 category on each of these search strings where, you know, 22 the numbers range from, you know, four figures to five 23 figures to six figures, depending on which category, and in 24 some cases seven figures, more than a million documents 25 depending on which category we're talking about. I'm being 26 told a very small fraction of the responsive documents have 27 been produced to date. That concerns me, because as our 28 prior discussion illustrates, we're all concerned about time limitations here.

I don't view this as an issue linked to the Plaintiffs' depositions or the third party depositions issues that we've been discussing, but it's obviously an important piece of the larger discovery pie. I'd like to get at least some sense at this point, recognizing that it's not a formal subject for IDC, that this is going to happen and it's going to happen timely in a way that doesn't jeopardize the entire schedule.

Mr. Shortnacy, you seem to have raised your hand to assure me that's not going to be a problem. I'd like some detail on that.

MR. SHORTNACY: Certainly, your Honor.

As we talked about in the last conference, the corporate documents are certainly voluminous, but Uber has made two productions previously. I forecasted to your Honor at the conference that we were going to make a production on the 30th. We did, in fact, make a production. Mr. Abramson has characterized that as small. It is small. And I think I tried to explain this to your Honor last time, but let me try again.

This is a complex, highly voluminous review project. It takes time to get the resources in place in terms of mechanics and processing and collection of the documents. That sort of power for liftoff, if you think of getting the jumbo jet off the runway, is considerable but once it gets going, it gets going. There was some delay, because as your Honor can see in the ESI protocol that was

submitted this morning in section 8, the provisions pertaining to the technology assisted review process, which we sometimes refer to as TAR -- I'm not sure of the page but it's at section 8 and following.

The COURT: I see it.

MR. SHORTNACY: That was just ruled on by Judge Cisneros and entered -- let me step back.

There were aspects of those provisions in dispute, and Judge Cisneros ruled on those provisions on the 15th of March. That sort of locked in place the process for the first time that would be used to apply technology assisted review to the review process. I'm explaining that to your Honor to explain why there was some delay. I think it was portrayed in the joint letter and the Plaintiff's position that we've had everything sitting around for six months, and so on and so forth. That's not the case.

The context to that is important. That March date is important. We're getting off the ground. We've made the production on April 30th. We're intending to make another production tomorrow, the 17th of May. That again, admittedly, will be relatively small, but we have projected a sort of pipeline and cadence for production that we believe we will be able to get through in June and July and following to be completed substantially by September.

Let me pause for a moment and talk about what that corpus looks like. When we talk about the TAR model and what your Honor is seeing in the hit report, the volumes are quite high, but the computer model which is fed decisions on

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responsiveness and sort of learns and predicts
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     responsiveness has to reach a point of stability where we
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     can comfortably cut off the review. That model is telling
     us that there are about 350,000 more documents to review,
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     and we believe that we will get through those documents by
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     September and that we have planned periodic rolling
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     productions to Plaintiffs in the interim that I can
     represent to the Court will be much more substantial than
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     they have been before, because, again, that TAR model is put
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     in place. The processes used are in place.
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     productions will pick up in volume.
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               So, I understand the criticism from Plaintiffs,
     but I can assure both the Plaintiffs and the Court that the
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     productions will become more voluminous as we get into the
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     next installments.
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               THE COURT: So, you're telling me the jumbo jet
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     here is barely off the runway, but it is picking up speed
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     and will be at altitude in time, essentially?
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               MR. SHORTNACY: Essentially, yes, that's right.
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               THE COURT: I hope you've been in touch with your
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     friends on the other side to let them know that, and I hope
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     you will remain in touch with them to keep them apprised of
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     your progress. Obviously, that's critical here. I don't
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     know what more I can do with this.
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               Does somebody on the Plaintiffs' side want to
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     address it? Mr. Abramson.
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               MR. ABRAMSON: I would, your Honor. Thank you.
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               I will tell you that what Mr. Shortnacy is saying,
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I understand it, but it is frustrating and it threatens our trial. Let me explain a little bit why.

We went through all of this at the CMC in April.

We put this in our joint letter. You asked them point-blank if they were going to substantially be able to produce the documents for the corporate liability side in the next couple of months. That would be the middle of June. Now, we're being told September 1st. That's a very big difference.

The problem with this is we cannot take a deposition of an Uber witness custodian until we have their complete custodial file. But we're being told based on the way the TAR system works -- and I've asked Mr. Shortnacy this several times over the last week or so -- is there a way to prioritize eight or nine of these 26 custodians so we get their complete custodial files in the next 30 days so we can start taking depositions of those people. And I haven't gotten a response. I don't know what the answer is.

I'm hopeful there's some ability to make progress. Let's assume there's not. Mr. Smith, when he was involved before, intimated to us that that's not possible. The way the TAR system runs, it has documents of all 26 custodians in a pot. It puts them out, but not by custodian but by relevance.

So, what Mr. Shortnacy is saying is it won't be until September 1st that we will know that we have a substantially complete custodial file for any Uber corporate witness. They may dump a bunch of documents on us on August

30th. It takes time to review those documents, which means we won't be able to take a single Uber corporate custodian liability, which is the essence of our case, until late September or October. That's just untenable.

And it is in direct contrast to what he told the Court. I'm not trying to cast aspersions. It is what is on the record from him at the April 12th hearing.

This is the first time I've heard September 1st.

That's why I'm frustrated. I'm a little bit taken aback.

This idea of just because you make a production and saying we're going to get a production just doesn't mean much. What is the production? Is the custodial file for a particular Uber witness substantially complete so that we can start taking depositions, which we have to do?

THE COURT: Let me go back a step and ask Mr. Shortnacy. I'm blessed not to know anything about this technology, so I can ask ignorant questions. In the abstract, I don't see any reason that you shouldn't be able to prioritize particular custodians. You just give the --you just run the search on whatever that subset is of documents first, as opposed to running it on the entire database.

Am I wrong?

MR. SHORTNACY: That's right. I think my colleague, Mr. Oot, can speak to that as well.

Mr. Oot, why don't you address that, and I want to address the issue Mr. Abramson raised at our last conversation, because that is not what we talked about in

terms of substantial completion. But I want to make sure your Honor's question is answered first.

MR. OOT: Patrick Oot from Shook, Hardy on behalf of Uber Defendants.

Just to back it up a little bit, the way the technology works, as Mr. Shortnacy mentioned, a lot of energy kind of goes into building the algorithm that selects the documents that are responsive. So, the key word search terms are the preliminary gateway that get us through to the use of the technology. Now, what's happened is through the meet-and-confer with Mr. Abramson, he asked that Plaintiffs obtain the benefit of the search terms from the MDL Plaintiffs. So, that discussion is going on. And that discussion will be either resolved or before Judge Cisneros by June 6th.

So, what is slowing the process down, I guess — and maybe this is what you're getting at — is that the additional keyword search term negotiations that are going on with the MDL where we agreed with Mr. Abramson that we would provide those additional documents here in the JCCP as part of the overall coordination is that we have to normalize that first gateway of the keyword search terms, and then the technology applies and there is some human review that helps stabilize that technology.

So, getting to your question of can we break out individual custodial files on sort of an ad hoc basis, that is something technically we can do, however, I would caveat that we would be using the JCCP word search terms that we

negotiated with Mr. Abramson, and there may be an issue where additional documents would be produced beyond an initial custodial file as a result of the negotiation.

What we're trying to avoid is a circumstance where we have a different custodial file that Mr. Abramson has access to than something that is later negotiated by June 6th in the MDL negotiations. So, we're trying to normalize that set so the coordination and all of the sort of benefits of that will apply in this case and the MDL.

THE COURT: Let me try and restate some of that in English to make sure I understood it. You all are in negotiations in the MDL regarding search terms or search strings, and those are to culminate in an agreement by June 6th or 7th, you said?

MR. OOT: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: That means the hit list that I've been given here as Exhibit 3 or whatever to the joint letter is a hit list in these coordinated proceedings based on the search terms or search strings that you've agreed to here.

Is that right?

MR. OOT: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: So no documents have actually been produced to date in the MDL because of the search protocol?

MR. OOT: Let's kind of back up. I wouldn't characterize as no documents, because there have been, I think, well over a hundred thousand documents that have been produced, but not what we'll call custodial documents.

Again, those custodial negotiations are going on in the MDL

as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Of the roughly hundred thousand documents produced in the MDL, have those been produced to the Plaintiffs in this case?

MR. OOT: Correct, your Honor. There are different buckets of MDL productions.

For example, there are prior litigation productions and productions related to other investigations. Those have all been produced. So, it's my understanding those documents have been produced to the JCCP as well.

I think under the coordination order we are going to have a pathway where all of those productions will go to a single vendor.

THE COURT: If I understood you correctly, the answer is, yes, it's technically possible to prioritize production from specified custodial files so that those productions can be done earlier rather than later, correct?

MR. OOT: Correct, your Honor. It does add an additional burden aside from the keyword search term discussion, just because in the way the algorithm is set to select the documents, prioritizing custodians doesn't really help us accomplish that goal.

THE COURT: If that's what needs to be done to satisfy the Plaintiff's understandable concern about avoiding further delay, even if it creates some additional burden and maybe it creates additional delay and duplication down the road, it seems to me that's a reasonable request for them to make. Mr. Abramson says you, plural, haven't

responded to that request. I guess I'm suggesting your response ought to be an affirmative one.

Mr. Shortnacy?

MR. SHORTNACY: I would say we will respond with the Court's guidance in mind. I do think this is an ongoing discussion. As Mr. Oot was explaining, it's also ongoing with the MDL Plaintiffs and will hopefully be resolved, or if not resolved, put before the MDL Court.

And just to touch base on one part, in our last discussion, that, if you remember, was when the issues were more informally linked as between Uber's productions and the depositions. And I understood your Honor to be asking at that time: Would Uber, over the course of the summer, produce enough documents to satisfy the Plaintiffs?

And I don't think there was the same context and nuance to that discussion. I wanted to address Mr.

Abramson's concern that might leave your Honor with the thought that I wasn't forthright or was backtracking on our prior discussion. I think those two things are quite different. I just wanted to clarify that for the Court.

THE COURT: I get the point that the documents are voluminous, that the productions are technically challenging, that there's potential conflict with what's going on in the MDL and what's going on here, but I'm hopeful that you've now heard Mr. Abramson's concern about delay. You've heard the Court's reaction. And hopefully that will help streamline things and get you all into the air where you need to be. I don't know what else to say

about that. 1 2 Mr. Abramson, is there anything else we can 3 usefully talk about at this point? 4 MR. ABRAMSON: On this issue, your Honor, no. 5 You've addressed it. I don't need to belabor it. 6 The other issue -- and it's in a footnote 1 in the 7 joint letter. 8 THE COURT: That's where I'm going next. 9 MR. ABRAMSON: Then, I'll let you go there. 10 I'm sorry. 11 THE COURT: That was last on my list, there. Ιf 12 I'm missing something here, somebody will let me know. Footnote 1 does indicate that the parties, having agreed on 13 14 26 priority custodians, have reached an impasse as to six 15 additional custodians that Plaintiffs have sought to add. 16 The footnote says the Plaintiffs are seeking permission to 17 file motions to compel production of responsive documents 18 held by those custodians. 19 So I understand this, again, the hit list that I'm 20 looking at here is a hit list on the documents held in the 21 26 custodial files and does not include these additional 22 six. 23 Is that right. 24 MR. ABRAMSON: That's right. If I could put a 25 little bit more color on the request, because it is in a 26 footnote. If you'll remember, we originally -- we, the 27 Plaintiffs -- proposed 143 custodians. That's a list that 28 we made up, okay? Over time, because there were these

concerns about delay and how voluminous the document productions would be, we agreed to reduce it to these 26 priority -- really, it was 18. And then we had motions to compel in front of your Honor on statistics, on senior executives, and on marketing and lobbying. Your Honor made certain rulings on those motions to compel.

And based on those rulings, we sought to add additional custodians. The parties agreed to eight of those additional custodians. We reached an impasse as to six of them. We've been negotiating these six custodians for a long time.

For example, Frank Chang. He is the head of Uber's data science group. He is the person who has signed off on documents that have gone to the TPUC. I'm not going to get into this, because it's not the proper time.

But we believe he's directly related to the kinds of documents we would need based on the ruling your Honor gave on the statistics motion. We'll probably get those in the custodial file.

(Whereupon, the court reporter asked the attorney to slow down.)

MR. ABRAMSON: Reason why we asked for Mr. Chang was because in response to your Honor's order on the statistics motion. The thought was we'd likely get those through a custodial file. If you still have a problem, come back and see me.

So, we said, well, let's add Mr. Chang so the likelihood of us getting those documents goes up

substantially. They pushed back on it. The other ones are related to marketing communications.

All we're asking for right now is a briefing schedule. The reason why we're raising this now is because of this delay and out concern about how long it's taking, that if we don't do it on a more expedited basis, then by the time we get an order it's going to be too late to get their documents and take depositions of these folks also.

MR. OOT: Your Honor, Mr. Abramson and I have been communicating about this set of custodians. What I did say to him is that this issue is likely not ripe yet because of the coordination with the MDL. That NDL discussion is still going on. June 6th, again, is the date that's going to really identify the custodian set for both cases. And Mr. Abramson is getting the benefit of that production through the coordination order.

So, what I asked him is that can we get through the MDL process, identify where we really do have the disagreements on the custodians so we're not double and maybe even triple briefing this. So, I think we've been working cooperatively up until now.

We understand his position on Frank Chang. We have a position on duplication with other custodians. I think we're working that through.

Another point. It's not just the MDL Plaintiffs. The JCCP Plaintiffs have a representation in the MDL as well. So, they're part of those discussions. The discussions are ongoing. If we have a disagreement, that

disagreement on custodians will be brought up with the MDL Court.

I think what we're asking is to let these negotiations for coordination for the benefit of all parties work out so then we could kind of move forward with the discovery.

THE COURT: What is the June 6th date in the MDL?

Is that the date for Magistrate Judge Cisneros to rule? Is it the final deadline for the parties to complete their negotiations? What is it exactly?

MR. OOT: If there's a disagreement, your Honor, the Plaintiffs are to submit that agreement to whether it be probably Judge Cisneros under PTO8 in the MDL. So, those are fast ruled upon under the existing case management order so there wouldn't be a significant amount of delay in the MDL related to the negotiation of keyword search terms and custodians.

Again, those discussions are ongoing. All Plaintiffs in the JCCP and MDL are participating in those discussions. All I asked Mr. Abramson was we hold off on a briefing schedule while we negotiate the MDL.

So, that is the true benefit of the coordination order that we're about to enter, is that both sides get access from the MDL and the JCCP discovery. It alleviates the burden on Plaintiffs in both cases because they're using one vendor and cooperating on that expense.

MR. SHORTNACY: The parties are also scheduled to be before Judge Cisneros on June 11th. So, the idea is that

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those issues would be discussed with the Court on that date as well, which is the June 6th date, as an agreement amongst the parties to try to perfect those issues and tee them up in advance of that case status conference on June 11th. Just to give the Court some additional color. MR. ABRAMSON: Well, at the risk of taking my own suggestion, let's see. THE COURT: Let's see if great minds think alike. MR. ABRAMSON: My suggestion would be this. understand the custodians negotiation in the MDL is ongoing. I understand. I'm also quite certain, based on the fact that I'm in leadership on the MDL, that the idea there's not going to be disagreement on June 6th is far fetched. There's going to be a disagreement. It's going to go to Judge Cisneros. She's going to make a ruling. I don't have her schedule. I would propose let's set a briefing schedule, but make it so that Uber's brief and response is not due until after the time they believe Judge Cisneros will rule. Make it June 11th. We'll take the burden of filing a motion to compel. They don't have to do anything. We're going to file. And they won't have to respond to it until after they know whether we've reached a resolution. That way, at least if this falls through, and it's

That way, at least if this falls through, and it's still an issue, we're teed up and ready to go, and we don't have to wait another 30 days.

THE COURT: I was going to suggest a slightly different approach, which is that the motion not be filed

until after June 6th or June 11th. Because of the possibility of that, depending on the negotiations and the MDL, it may become unnecessary or moot, at least to some extent. June 6th is only three weeks away.

So long as Uber's response has a reasonable time after they have a ruling from Judge Cisneros and they can tell me, you know, no, now we don't have a dispute over six custodians, we only have a dispute over three, fine. That makes sense to me. I don't have a problem with that.

MR. ABRAMSON: My preference would be for us to do hopefully some unnecessary work so that in the event there's not a resolution, Uber's response deadline is very soon after the time at which Judge Cisneros would rule so we're not wasting any additional time.

MR. OOT: Your Honor, I would just propose to avoid the needless motion, it's still going to be effort on Defendants regardless of Mr. Abramson says he's going to take the burden, that the motion not be filed until June 15th which would be after the issue is due to Judge Cisneros. And, likely, we may even have a ruling from her. And we can revisit the scheduling of Uber's response at that time.

THE COURT: I mean, if the Plaintiffs want to take on an unnecessary burden of filing an early motion which, frankly, I'm not going to read until I have an opposition, that's their lookout. You can file your motion anytime you're ready to file it, Mr. Abramson.

We'll set the opposition date after the expected

time of ruling by Judge Cisneros. It looks June 15th is a 1 2 Saturday. 3 Do you want to set that for the 17th, Mr. Oot? MR. OOT: With the caveat that we would hear from 4 5 Judge Cisneros first and seek leave of the Court if we 6 haven't received an order from Judge Cisneros. 7 THE COURT: That seems reasonable to me. interests of having some certainly, let's set a deadline 8 9 now. You'll meet with her, and she'll tell you whether 10 she's going to move quickly or not, presumably. You know, 11 you can then come back to me or to the clerk by a joint 12 communication by saying we think it makes more sense to extend this by a week or two or whatever it is. I'm happy 13 14 to do that. Makes sense. 15 MR. ABRAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. 16 MR. OOT: Thank you, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Do we pick a hearing date now? 18 MR. ABRAMSON: That would be good. 19 THE COURT: I'd like to see this get resolved 20 sooner rather than later. What if we pick something as soon 21 as before the July 4th holiday, let's say. 22 MR. ABRAMSON: That works for us. If they file 23 their response by June 17th, we'll agree to turn it around 24 by the 21st, if it's okay with your Honor. If it's possible 25 to have a hearing some time the next week or that week 26 before the fourth, that's good with us. 27 THE COURT: The 27th. 28 MR. SHORTNACY: Can I, at the risk of upsetting

the apple cart here, I understand the approach your Honor is suggesting, and I'm not disagreeable with it.

I wanted to raise one timing issue. If the purpose is to let the MDL discussion play out to tee something up to perfect it for Judge Cisneros and to appear before her on June 11th, discuss those issues, she may require additional briefing or not. We'll certainly have quidance from her on June 11th.

My fear is on the date that we just discussed of an opposition of some four business days later or something, it presupposes we will be working up an opposition in parallel with the discussions and with potential guidance from Judge Cisneros. So, it's a little bit off kilter from letting that process play out. I would just ask to push the time for the opposition out a little further so we don't find Uber taking on work that's undisputed after guidance from Judge Cisneros, for example.

I want to avoid generating that as well, even though Mr. Abramson is wanting to file the motion.

Does that make sense, your Honor, in terms of the timing?

THE COURT: How about this? The Plaintiffs can file their motion whenever they feel appropriate. Uber files opposition on the 21st of June. No reply hearing on the 27th. Everybody okay with that?

MR. ABRAMSON: That works for us.

MR. SHORTNACY: Your Honor, can we do the hearing over Zoom?

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THE COURT: That's fine. June 27th at 11:00 a.m. Does that work for everybody?

The only other thing I would say is I would urge you all -- I'm sure you're having these discussions in the context of the MDL. As I recall from the prior motions, at least one of the issues that's likely to get raised by Uber, and presumably has already been raised by Uber, is whether a given custodian is likely to be duplicative of another custodian or another witness. I remember there were arguments about, well, gee, do you really need to look at the inbox of so-and-so who is a more senior person when the person who was really in charge of Issue X or Issue Y reported to that person, but you're really getting a superior witness and you're not missing anything if you talk to the person who had the primary responsibility for that. Somebody who is the regional VP for marketing for the Western Hemisphere, it's going to be a small part of their task to be overseeing marketing in the western United States or something to that effect. I would urge you to keep having those discussions. If there's a way to narrow down the dispute here from six to four to two or wherever you come out, based on a good faith representation by counsel, where if need be a brief declaration from somebody like that who says: Yeah, I would have been copied on this stuff, but I don't have anything that my subordinate wouldn't have. Just a way to see if you can see your way through all of this without fighting about everything.

MR. ABRAMSON: We will do that, your Honor. Thank

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     you.
               THE COURT: We haven't set a deadline for the
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     Plaintiffs' motion. I suppose we ought to do so just so we
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     have something on paper. You want to do it by May 31, a
 5
     couple of weeks from now?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: Sure, yeah. We can do it by then.
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               THE COURT: Okay, all right. Have we made at
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     least some progress and accomplished what we can for the
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     day?
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               MR. ABRAMSON: I think so.
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               MR. SHORTNACY: Your Honor, thank you very much
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     for your time.
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               MS. RUBIN:
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               MS. PHILLIPS: Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. Bye-bye.
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               (Whereupon, court proceedings adjourned.)
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1 SS. 2 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 3 4 5 I, AMY GOODING, CSR, HEREBY CERTIFY: 6 That I was the duly appointed, qualified shorthand 7 reporter of said court in the above action taken on the 8 above date; that I reported the same in machine shorthand 9 and thereafter had the same transcribed through 10 computer-aided transcription as herein appears; and that the 11 foregoing pages contain a true and correct transcript of the 12 proceedings had in said matter at said time and place to the 13 best of my ability. 14 I further certify that I have complied with CCP 15 237(a)(2) in that all personal juror identifying information 16 has been redacted, if applicable. 17 DATED: May 17, 2024 18 19 Amy Gooding, CSR 20 CSR Certificate No. 13386 21 22 23 California Government Code section 69954(d) states: 24 "Any court, party, or person who has purchased a transcript may, without paying a further fee to the 25 reporter, reproduce a copy or portion thereof as an exhibit pursuant to court order or rule, or for internal use, but shall not otherwise provide or sell a copy or copies to any 26 other party or person." 27 28